Stable solutions on matching models with quota restriction

DOI10.1142/S0219198911002927MaRDI QIDQ2883138zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Delfina Femenia, Mabel Marí, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo

Publication date 11 May 2012

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198911002927

zbMATH Keywords

matching\(q\)-stablequota restriction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching
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• Agreement toward stability in matching markets
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Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems.
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners

Cited in

(4)

• A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
• Stability in a job market with linearly increasing valuations and quota system
• On the number of employed in the matching model
• Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching

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