Stable solutions on matching models with quota restriction
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Publication:2883138
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Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems.
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
Cited in
(4)- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
- Stability in a job market with linearly increasing valuations and quota system
- On the number of employed in the matching model
- Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching
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