Stable solutions on matching models with quota restriction

DOI10.1142/S0219198911002927zbMATH Open1236.91107OpenAlexW1985165141MaRDI QIDQ2883138FDOQ2883138

Authors: Delfina Femenia, Mabel Marí, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo 

Publication date: 11 May 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198911002927

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zbMATH Keywords

matching\(q\)-stablequota restriction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems.

Cited In (4)

• A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
• Stability in a job market with linearly increasing valuations and quota system
• On the number of employed in the matching model
• Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching

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