Stable matching in large economies
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5135703 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1416652 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3092990 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- A theory of school-choice lotteries
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Clubs and the Market
- Clubs and the market: Large finite economies
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Competitive equilibrium with local public goods
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
- Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
- Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings
- Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
- Fixed point theorems on partially ordered topological vector spaces and their applications to equilibrium problems with incomplete preferences
- Game theory
- Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- Incentive compatibility of large centralized matching markets
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Marriage, honesty, and stability
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- On Equilibrium in Graham's Model of World Trade and Other Competitive Systems
- On a characterization of stable matchings
- On the Existence of General Equilibrium for a Competitive Market
- Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
- Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
- Quasi-Equilibria in Markets with Non-Convex Preferences
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Real analysis
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Stable matching in large economies
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- The Core of an N Person Game
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Verifiability and group formation in markets
- Walrasian equilibrium in large, quasilinear markets
Cited in
(35)- The law of large numbers for large stable matchings
- Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms
- Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects
- Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies
- On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
- Pairwise stable matching in large economies
- Household formation and markets
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems
- Stable matching: An integer programming approach
- The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- Local stability constraints
- On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice
- Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- Multiperiod matching
- Large matching markets as two-sided demand systems
- Sustainable matching plans with adverse selection
- Stable solutions on matching models with quota restriction
- Partitionable choice functions and stability
- Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
- Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
- Stable matching with network externalities
- Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core
- Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies
- Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- Epsilon-stability in school choice
- What matchings can be stable? The testable implications of matching theory
- Stable matching in large economies
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Stability in matching markets with peer effects
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
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