What matchings can be stable? The testable implications of matching theory
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Publication:3168993
DOI10.1287/MOOR.1080.0318zbMATH Open1232.91527OpenAlexW2125704112MaRDI QIDQ3168993FDOQ3168993
Authors: Federico Echenique 
Publication date: 27 April 2011
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1080.0318
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