What matchings can be stable? The testable implications of matching theory

DOI10.1287/MOOR.1080.0318MaRDI QIDQ3168993zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Federico Echenique

Publication date 27 April 2011

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1080.0318

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingsinverse optimizationrevealed preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Matching models (91B68)

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