Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6063089
DOI10.1007/s00199-022-01479-5zbMath1529.91023OpenAlexW4312193959MaRDI QIDQ6063089
Kareen Rozen, Geoffroy de Clippel
Publication date: 7 November 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01479-5
Cites Work
- Game theory via revealed preferences
- Afriat's theorem for general budget sets
- On the testable implications of collective choice theories
- On cores and indivisibility
- The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
- What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory
- The Complexity of Rationalizing Matchings
- On the consistency of data with bargaining theories
- Bounded rationality and limited data sets
- Revealed Preference Tests of the Cournot Model
This page was built for publication: Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy