Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy

DOI10.1007/s00199-022-01479-5zbMath1529.91023OpenAlexW4312193959MaRDI QIDQ6063089

Kareen Rozen, Geoffroy de Clippel

Publication date: 7 November 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01479-5

zbMATH Keywords

serial dictatorshipempirical contentcore of housing markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

• Game theory via revealed preferences
• Afriat's theorem for general budget sets
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• On cores and indivisibility
• The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
• What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory
• The Complexity of Rationalizing Matchings
• On the consistency of data with bargaining theories
• Bounded rationality and limited data sets
• Revealed Preference Tests of the Cournot Model

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