On the testable implications of collective choice theories
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Publication:1587639
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2657zbMath0976.91014OpenAlexW1973871892MaRDI QIDQ1587639
Publication date: 3 December 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2657
Related Items (28)
Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees ⋮ Do voters vote ideologically? ⋮ Paretian quasi-orders: the regular two-agent case ⋮ Identification of payoffs in repeated games ⋮ Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games ⋮ Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games ⋮ Nonparametric utility theory in strategic settings: revealing preferences and beliefs from proposal-response games ⋮ Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy ⋮ Efficient and non-deteriorating choice. ⋮ Choosing the two finalists ⋮ Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set ⋮ The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior ⋮ The testable implications of zero-sum games ⋮ On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Learnability and rationality of choice. ⋮ Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: Testable restrictions and identification. ⋮ A nonparametric analysis of multi-product oligopolies ⋮ The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior ⋮ A utility representation theorem for general revealed preference ⋮ Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games ⋮ Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability ⋮ Game theory via revealed preferences ⋮ Implications of Pareto efficiency for two-agent (household) choice ⋮ Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable ⋮ Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries ⋮ Descriptive complexity and revealed preference theory ⋮ Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice ⋮ Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
Cites Work
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- Choice functions, rationality conditions, and variations on the weak axiom of revealed preference
- The maximal generic number of pure Nash equilibria
- Choice structures and preference relations
- Rational Household Labor Supply
- Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
- The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data
- Testable Restrictions on the Equilibrium Manifold
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
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