On the testable implications of collective choice theories
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Publication:1587639
DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2657zbMATH Open0976.91014OpenAlexW1973871892MaRDI QIDQ1587639FDOQ1587639
Authors: Yves Sprumont 
Publication date: 3 December 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2657
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Cites Work
- The maximal generic number of pure Nash equilibria
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- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
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- Choice functions, rationality conditions, and variations on the weak axiom of revealed preference
- Choice structures and preference relations
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Cited In (33)
- Do voters vote ideologically?
- Learnability and rationality of choice.
- Nonparametric utility theory in strategic settings: revealing preferences and beliefs from proposal-response games
- Descriptive complexity and revealed preference theory
- Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries
- Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set
- Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable
- Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: Testable restrictions and identification.
- The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior
- Implications of Pareto efficiency for two-agent (household) choice
- Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games
- Recent advances on testability in economic equilibrium models
- Core rationalizability in two-agent exchange economies.
- Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
- Choosing the two finalists
- Paretian quasi-orders: the regular two-agent case
- Efficient and non-deteriorating choice.
- Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy
- Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees
- The testable implications of zero-sum games
- On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution
- Identification of payoffs in repeated games
- Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
- A nonparametric analysis of multi-product oligopolies
- Does collective rationality entail efficiency?
- Correlated choice
- Game theory via revealed preferences
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior
- A utility representation theorem for general revealed preference
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
- Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice
- Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games
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