On the testable implications of collective choice theories
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Publication:1587639
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3761717 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3205074 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3417398 (Why is no real title available?)
- Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
- Choice functions, rationality conditions, and variations on the weak axiom of revealed preference
- Choice structures and preference relations
- Rational Household Labor Supply
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
- Testable Restrictions on the Equilibrium Manifold
- The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data
- The maximal generic number of pure Nash equilibria
Cited in
(33)- A nonparametric analysis of multi-product oligopolies
- Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: Testable restrictions and identification.
- Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees
- Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy
- A utility representation theorem for general revealed preference
- Choosing the two finalists
- Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
- Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries
- Implications of Pareto efficiency for two-agent (household) choice
- Nonparametric utility theory in strategic settings: revealing preferences and beliefs from proposal-response games
- Paretian quasi-orders: the regular two-agent case
- Game theory via revealed preferences
- The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior
- Learnability and rationality of choice.
- Does collective rationality entail efficiency?
- The testable implications of zero-sum games
- Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games
- Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games
- On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution
- Identification of payoffs in repeated games
- Efficient and non-deteriorating choice.
- Core rationalizability in two-agent exchange economies.
- The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior
- Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
- Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set
- Recent advances on testability in economic equilibrium models
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
- Descriptive complexity and revealed preference theory
- Correlated choice
- Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5159049 (Why is no real title available?)
- Do voters vote ideologically?
- Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice
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