Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
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Publication:393277
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.008zbMath1294.91025MaRDI QIDQ393277
Publication date: 16 January 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repec.org/esNASM04/up.24581.1075493308.pdf
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