Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:393277)
Recommendations
- Game theory via revealed preferences
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
- Information, rational beliefs and equilibrium refinements
- Conditions for equivalence between sequentiality and subgame perfection
Cites work
- A course in game theory.
- A testable model of consumption with externalities
- Core rationalizability in two-agent exchange economies.
- Efficient and non-deteriorating choice.
- Empirical Implications of Information Structure in Finite Extensive Form Games
- Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: Testable restrictions and identification.
- Every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable
- Game theory via revealed preferences
- Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries
- On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution
- On the testable implications of collective choice theories
- Paretian quasi-orders: the regular two-agent case
- Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees
- Rationalizing Choice Functions By Multiple Rationales
- Revealed preference tests of the Cournot model
- Revealed Preference Theory
- Testable implications of coalitional rationality
- Testable implications of Pareto efficiency and individualrationality
- Tests for the consistency of consumer data
- The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games
- The testable implications of competitive equilibrium in economies with externalities
- The testable implications of zero-sum games
Cited in
(10)- Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: Testable restrictions and identification.
- Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable
- A utility representation theorem for general revealed preference
- Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
- The testable implications of zero-sum games
- Identification of payoffs in repeated games
- Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set
- Recent advances on testability in economic equilibrium models
- Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
- Game theory via revealed preferences
This page was built for publication: Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q393277)
