Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111554MaRDI QIDQ6154274zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wei Ma

Publication date 19 March 2024

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111554

zbMATH Keywords

backwards-inductionchoice correspondencechoice functionrationalizabilityrevealed preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Cites work

• Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Game theory via revealed preferences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3163334 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3652325 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implications of Pareto efficiency for two-agent (household) choice
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries
• Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
• On the consistency of data with bargaining theories
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees

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