Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.002zbMath1157.91329OpenAlexW2057074043MaRDI QIDQ2373789

Yongsheng Xu, Lin Zhou

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.002

zbMATH Keywords

separabilitychoice functionrationalizabilitygame treedivergence consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items

Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games ⋮ Bounded rationality is rare ⋮ Non-existence of continuous choice functions ⋮ Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set ⋮ The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior ⋮ The testable implications of zero-sum games ⋮ The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior ⋮ A foundation for strategic agenda voting ⋮ Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules ⋮ Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents ⋮ Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable ⋮ Cluster-shortlisted choice ⋮ Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable ⋮ Sophisticated Strategic Choice

Cites Work

• Game theory via revealed preferences
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Revealed Preference Theory
• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference