Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.01.002MaRDI QIDQ2373789zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yongsheng Xu, Lin Zhou

Publication date 16 July 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.002

zbMATH Keywords

separabilityrationalizabilitychoice functiongame treedivergence consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08)

Recommendations

• Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Rationalizability in continuous games
• On the concepts of rationalizability in games
• Rationalizability in multicriteria games
• Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games
• Some rationalizability results for dynamic games
• Rationalizable strategies in random games
• Rationality in qualitative games
• Proof-theoretic analysis of rationality for strategic games with arbitrary strategy sets

Cites work

• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• Game theory via revealed preferences
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Revealed Preference Theory

Cited in

(17)

• Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules
• A simple model of two-stage choice
• Sophisticated Strategic Choice
• Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
• Non-existence of continuous choice functions
• The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior
• Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
• The testable implications of zero-sum games
• The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior
• Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set
• Choice structures in games
• Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Bounded rationality is rare
• A foundation for strategic agenda voting
• Cluster-shortlisted choice

This page was built for publication: Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2373789)