On the concepts of rationalizability in games
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Publication:1593553
DOI10.1023/A:1018952930188zbMATH Open0966.91019MaRDI QIDQ1593553FDOQ1593553
Authors: Stanislaw Ambroszkiewicz
Publication date: 17 January 2001
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- A rational way of playing: revision theory for strategic interaction
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees
- Games suggest how to define rational behavior. Surprising aspects of interactive decision theory
- Knowledge, behavior, and rationality: rationalizability in epistemic games
- Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
- On game ideals
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- Game justification of the rule of self-consistent choice
- Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality
- An epistemic generalization of rationalizability
- Exploiting Game Theory for Analysing Justifications
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