Epistemic conditions for rationalizability

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.010zbMath1134.91342MaRDI QIDQ926902

Eduardo Zambrano

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1032&context=econ_fac

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledge; rationalizability; interactive epistemology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

Related Items

Pairwise epistemic conditions for correlated rationalizability, Epistemically robust strategy subsets

Cites Work

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