The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
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Publication:1108208
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90276-1zbMath0653.90098OpenAlexW2070645636MaRDI QIDQ1108208
Tommy Chin-Chiu Tan, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/866
noncooperative gamecorrelated equilibriaiteratively undominated strategiesBayesian decision problemNash equilibrium behaviorrationality of playersrationalizable strategic behavior
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