Uncertain information structures and backward induction

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.05.004zbMATH Open1394.91029OpenAlexW2643662728MaRDI QIDQ2399686FDOQ2399686

Authors: Peio Zuazo-Garin 

Publication date: 24 August 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://addi.ehu.es/handle/10810/12097

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zbMATH Keywords

rationalityincomplete informationperfect informationbackward inductionextensive-form gamesforward induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
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• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
• Conditional belief types
• On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability
• Robust dynamic implementation
• Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information
• A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals

Cited In (5)

• Backward induction is not robust: The parity problem and the uncertainty problem
• Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies
• Incomplete information: Structure, inference, complexity
• Uncertain information: random variables in graded semilattices
• Propagating uncertain information forward

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