Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
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Publication:1363539
DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0104zbMATH Open0874.90204OpenAlexW2109574857MaRDI QIDQ1363539FDOQ1363539
Publication date: 10 August 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2db2a035c4c83f01282217c666ed6e0dd1ae9256
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- Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
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- Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
- Knowing and supposing in games of perfect information
- Community-based reasoning in games: salience, rule-following, and counterfactuals
- Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction
- Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
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- Common Knowledge Logic in a Higher Order Proof Assistant
- AGM 25 years. Twenty-five years of research in belief change
- A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
- From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
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- Uncertain information structures and backward induction
- Toward a theory of play: a logical perspective on games and interaction
- The predictive role of counterfactuals
- Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction
- Conditional belief types
- Rational play in extensive-form games
- Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information
- Substantive rationality and backward induction
- Infinite games with finite knowledge gaps
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