Belief in the opponents' future rationality
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.11.008zbMATH Open1284.91056OpenAlexW2005957100MaRDI QIDQ2437178FDOQ2437178
Publication date: 3 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.008
Recommendations
- Common belief in future and restricted past rationality
- Finite reasoning procedures for dynamic games
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- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
dynamic gamesepistemic game theorybackward inductionbelief in future rationalitybackward dominance procedurebackwards rationalizability procedure
Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
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- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
- The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality
- Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games
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- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
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- Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
- The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
Cited In (32)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Weakly rational expectations
- An epistemic characterization of MACA
- On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability
- Modeling reasoning in a social setting
- Order independence for rationalizability
- Limited focus in dynamic games
- Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
- Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games
- Choice-driven counterfactuals
- On non-monotonic strategic reasoning
- Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
- Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
- Common belief in future and restricted past rationality
- King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
- A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
- Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games
- Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
- Uncertain information structures and backward induction
- Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Well-Founded Games
- Perfect forward induction
- ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
- Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
- Robust dynamic implementation
- Rational play in extensive-form games
- Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction
- Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
- On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets
- An epistemic approach to stochastic games
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