Belief in the opponents' future rationality

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.008zbMath1284.91056OpenAlexW2005957100MaRDI QIDQ2437178

Andrés Perea

Publication date: 3 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.008

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesbackward inductionepistemic game theorybelief in future rationalitybackward dominance procedurebackwards rationalizability procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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