Belief in the opponents' future rationality
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Publication:2437178
Recommendations
- Common belief in future and restricted past rationality
- Finite reasoning procedures for dynamic games
- On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets
- Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5734945 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
- Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
- Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- On the strategic equivalence of extensive form games
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Sequential Equilibria
- Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games
- Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality
- The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
Cited in
(34)- Weakly rational expectations
- An epistemic characterization of MACA
- Modeling reasoning in a social setting
- On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability
- Limited focus in dynamic games
- Order independence for rationalizability
- Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
- Choice-driven counterfactuals
- Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games
- On non-monotonic strategic reasoning
- Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
- Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
- Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
- Common belief in future and restricted past rationality
- King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot
- Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
- A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
- Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
- Uncertain information structures and backward induction
- Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games
- Perfect forward induction
- ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
- Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Well-Founded Games
- Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
- Robust dynamic implementation
- Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction
- Rational play in extensive-form games
- Finite reasoning procedures for dynamic games
- Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
- On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets
- An epistemic approach to stochastic games
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