The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality
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Publication:1915704
DOI10.1006/game.1996.0018zbMath0848.90130MaRDI QIDQ1915704
Ebbe Hendon, Hans Jørgen Jacobson, Brigitte Sloth
Publication date: 1 July 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0018
91A10: Noncooperative games
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