Dynamic mechanism design with budget-constrained buyers under limited commitment
DOI10.1287/OPRE.2018.1830zbMATH Open1455.91066OpenAlexW2942770719MaRDI QIDQ5126629FDOQ5126629
Authors: Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes, Gabriel Y. Weintraub 
Publication date: 20 October 2020
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1830
Recommendations
fluid approximationdynamic mechanism designlimited commitmentrevenue managementbudget constraintsInternet auctionsdisplay advertising
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
- Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
- Trees and extensive forms
- Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
- Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
- Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- Optimal Auction Design
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Continuous Time Repeated Games
- Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce
- Optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
- Optimal auction design under non-commitment
- Small BV Solutions of Hyperbolic Noncooperative Differential Games
- Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
- Revenue management by sequential screening
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design and the virtual-pivot mechanism
- Dynamic screening with limited commitment
- Dynamic pay-per-action mechanisms and applications to online advertising
Cited In (2)
This page was built for publication: Dynamic mechanism design with budget-constrained buyers under limited commitment
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5126629)
