Dynamic mechanism design with budget-constrained buyers under limited commitment
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7047927 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5681750 (Why is no real title available?)
- Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
- Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
- Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
- Continuous Time Repeated Games
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Dynamic pay-per-action mechanisms and applications to online advertising
- Dynamic screening with limited commitment
- Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
- Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal auction design under non-commitment
- Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design and the virtual-pivot mechanism
- Revenue management by sequential screening
- Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
- Small BV Solutions of Hyperbolic Noncooperative Differential Games
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality
- The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
- Trees and extensive forms
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