Revenue management by sequential screening
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.07.016zbMATH Open1330.91078OpenAlexW1905430731MaRDI QIDQ900601FDOQ900601
Authors: Mustafa Akan, Barış Ata, James D. jun. Dana 
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.016
Recommendations
price discriminationdynamic mechanism designdynamic pricingrevenue managementintertemporal price discrimination
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
- Convex Analysis
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Sequential screening
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device
- Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
- The theory and practice of revenue management
- Intertemporal Price Discrimination
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Dynamic competition with random demand and costless search: a theory of price posting
- Airline Seat Allocation with Multiple Nested Fare Classes
- Selling options
- When is price discrimination profitable?
- Optimal selling scheme for heterogeneous consumers with uncertain valuations
- Revenue Management with Partially Refundable Fares
- Dynamic screening with limited commitment
Cited In (18)
- Reversing privatization as a screening mechanism
- Congestion-based leadtime quotation and pricing for revenue maximization with heterogeneous customers
- Optimal selling scheme for heterogeneous consumers with uncertain valuations
- Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
- Learning in nonlinear pricing with unknown utility functions
- A comparison of the merchant and agency models in the hotel industry
- Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device
- Partial refunds as a strategic price commitment device in advance selling in a service industry
- Design of incentive programs for optimal medication adherence in the presence of observable consumption
- On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
- Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights
- Screening by mode of trade
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Optimal decisions for sellers considering valuation bias and strategic consumer reactions
- The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints
- Sequential screening
- Dynamic mechanism design with budget-constrained buyers under limited commitment
- Screening in space: rich and poor consumers in a linear city
This page was built for publication: Revenue management by sequential screening
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q900601)
