Revenue management by sequential screening

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.016zbMath1330.91078OpenAlexW1905430731MaRDI QIDQ900601

James D. jun. Dana, Barış Ata, Mustafa Akan

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.016

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic pricingrevenue managementprice discriminationdynamic mechanism designintertemporal price discrimination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

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Cites Work

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