Screening in space: rich and poor consumers in a linear city

DOI10.15826/UMJ.2021.1.005zbMATH Open1471.91172OpenAlexW3191272669MaRDI QIDQ5155574FDOQ5155574

Authors: Sergeĭ G. Kokovin, F. P. Vasil'ev 

Publication date: 7 October 2021

Published in: Ural mathematical journal (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://mathnet.ru/eng/umj137

Recommendations

• Competitive screening under heterogeneous information
• Screening in vertical oligopolies
• Sequential screening
• Revenue management by sequential screening
• Screening by mode of trade

zbMATH Keywords

screeningnon-convex optimizationprice discriminationspatial competitionprincipal-agent modellinear city

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Nonuniform Pricing with Unobservable Numbers of Purchases
• Method of digraphs for multi-dimensional screening
• Screening in vertical oligopolies

Cited In (8)

• Ticket pricing and the impression of excess demand
• Dupuit conjecture for constrained screening: overall distortion and type-partitioning
• Competitive screening under heterogeneous information
• Screening by mode of trade
• Screening while controlling an externality
• Sequential screening
• Revenue management by sequential screening
• Screening in vertical oligopolies

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