Screening while controlling an externality
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Publication:6160058
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.011zbMath1519.91150OpenAlexW3195304802MaRDI QIDQ6160058
Publication date: 23 June 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.011
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Cites Work
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