Screening while controlling an externality

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.011zbMath1519.91150OpenAlexW3195304802MaRDI QIDQ6160058

Franz Ostrizek, Elia Sartori

Publication date: 23 June 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.011

zbMATH Keywords

influenceexternalityironingmultidimensional screening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (1)

Selling information in competitive environments

Cites Work

• Ironing without control
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
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• Nonlinear pricing and type-dependent network effects
• Pricing in social networks
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• Optimal Auction Design
• Contracting with Externalities
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation
• Pricing Network Effects
• Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
• Using Gossips to Spread Information: Theory and Evidence from Two Randomized Controlled Trials
• Targeting Interventions in Networks
• Redistribution Through Markets
• When Is Pure Bundling Optimal?
• Optimal Nonlinear Pricing in Social Networks Under Asymmetric Network Information

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