Ironing without control

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.003zbMath1243.91058MaRDI QIDQ654524

Juuso Toikka

Publication date: 28 December 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.003

zbMATH Keywords

optimization; principal-agent model; mechanism design; ironing; monotonicity constraint

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90C29: Multi-objective and goal programming

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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