Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling
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Publication:2211475
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105085zbMath1455.91215OpenAlexW3039521501MaRDI QIDQ2211475
Edward E. Schlee, Hector Chade
Publication date: 11 November 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105085
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Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
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