Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105085zbMath1455.91215OpenAlexW3039521501MaRDI QIDQ2211475

Edward E. Schlee, Hector Chade

Publication date: 11 November 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105085

zbMATH Keywords

poolingloadinginsuranceadverse selectioncoverage denials

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

Related Items (2)

Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection

Cites Work

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• Old, Frail, and Uninsured: Accounting for Features of the U.S. Long‐Term Care Insurance Market

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