Optimal insurance with adverse selection
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Publication:4586112
DOI10.3982/TE671zbMATH Open1395.91248MaRDI QIDQ4586112FDOQ4586112
Authors: Hector Chade, Edward E. Schlee
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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wealth effectsquantity discountscommon valuesprincipal-agent modelempirical tests for adverse selectionmonopoly insurance
Cited In (26)
- Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling
- The premium as informational cue in insurance decision making
- Information design in competitive insurance markets
- Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
- Optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly, inexact verification
- Optimal reinsurance design with distortion risk measures and asymmetric information
- Monopoly insurance under adverse selection when agents differ in risk aversion
- Optimal insurance design with a bonus
- On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
- Concave distortion risk minimizing reinsurance design under adverse selection
- Extraction of surplus under adverse selection: The case of insurance markets
- Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection
- Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection
- Revisiting the optimal insurance design under adverse selection: distortion risk measures and tail-risk overestimation
- REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION
- Insurance contracts and financial markets
- The pricing of optimal insurance policies
- An adaptive strategy for offering m-out-of-n insurance policies
- A duality and free boundary approach to adverse selection
- Corrigendum to: ``Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions
- Adverse selection under ignorance
- Insurance with heterogeneous preferences
- Premium risk and managed care
- (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
- Optimal insurance in a changing economy
- Reinsurance contract design with adverse selection
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