Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection

DOI10.1007/S11166-008-9056-7MaRDI QIDQ1025622zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philippe De Donder, Jean Hindriks

Publication date 19 June 2009

Published in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/1668/1/adverse_selection.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
• The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
• The impact of prudence on optimal prevention

Cited in

(9)

• Adverse selection or advantageous selection? Risk and underwriting in China's health-insurance market
• Early selection and moral hazard
• Is there adverse selection in the U.S. social security system?
• Does bundling induce adverse selection in insurance?
• Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
• Claim timing and \textit{ex post} adverse selection
• Adverse Selection and Security Design
• Robust SME investment and financing under market frictions
• Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance

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