Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
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Publication:852326
DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0040-zzbMath1120.91019MaRDI QIDQ852326
Bernard Salanié, François Salanié, Bruno Jullien
Publication date: 29 November 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/1345/1/salanie_jullien.pdf
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Cites Work
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