Participation constraints in adverse selection models

Cites Work

Cited In (78)

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Coordination and externalities
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Participation constraints in adverse selection models
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Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
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Sharing Profits in the Sharing Economy
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A model of secular migration from centralized to decentralized trade
Method of digraphs for multi-dimensional screening
Insurance contracts and financial markets
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OPTIMAL REINSURANCE DESIGN WITH DISTORTION RISK MEASURES AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

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