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DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.10.009MaRDI QIDQ654512zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst

Publication date 28 December 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.009

zbMATH Keywords

informationprice discriminationsingle crossing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Utility theory (91B16) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Direct and Indirect Sale of Information
• Optimal Preorder Strategy with Endogenous Information Control
• How to sell hard information
• Selling with evidence
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination

Cites work

• Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• On countervailing incentives
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
• Sequential screening
• Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination

Cited in

(7)

• Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
• Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result
• Optimal sequential delegation
• Optimal discriminatory disclosure
• Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions
• Ex post information rents in sequential screening
• Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions

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