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Publication:654512
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.009zbMath1229.91144OpenAlexW2005620463MaRDI QIDQ654512
Roman Inderst, Florian Hoffmann
Publication date: 28 December 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.009
Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
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Optimal sequential delegation ⋮ Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result ⋮ Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities ⋮ Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions ⋮ Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions ⋮ Ex post information rents in sequential screening
Cites Work
- Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
- Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- On countervailing incentives
- Sequential Screening
- Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
- Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
- Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
