Pre-sale information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:654512
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.10.009zbMATH Open1229.91144OpenAlexW2005620463MaRDI QIDQ654512FDOQ654512
Roman Inderst, Florian Hoffmann
Publication date: 28 December 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.009
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Utility theory (91B16) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Sequential screening
- Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
- Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
- Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
- On countervailing incentives
- Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
Cited In (6)
- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result
- Optimal sequential delegation
- Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions
- Ex post information rents in sequential screening
- Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
This page was built for publication: Pre-sale information
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q654512)
