Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination

DOI10.2307/2527055zbMATH Open0802.90033OpenAlexW2056141923MaRDI QIDQ4301656FDOQ4301656

Tracy R. Lewis, David E. M. Sappington

Publication date: 14 August 1994

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/c9715e52accb1d23dc6ffdaf36c9b1437b19e356

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zbMATH Keywords

private informationsellerbuyers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Cited In (60)

• The influence of online customer reviews on two-stage product strategy in a competitive market
• Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing
• Optimal contest design: tuning the heat
• Competitive fit‐revelation sampling and mixed pricing strategy
• Pricing and structuring product trials: separate versus mixed wine tastings
• Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition
• Perfect robust implementation by private information design
• Pricing Diagnostic Information
• Disclosure of quality preference-revealing information in a supply chain with competitive products
• Price competition in the presence of a web aggregator
• Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition
• Consumer search with blind buying
• Technical Note—Signaling Product Quality Through a Trial Period
• Signalling, information and consumer fraud
• Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
• Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough
• Intentional vagueness
• Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks
• Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability
• Competitive pricing and advertising with spillover
• Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device
• Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions
• Pre-sale information
• Censorship as optimal persuasion
• Optimal auctions with information acquisition
• Recent developments in the economics of price discrimination
• Price competition for an informed buyer
• Efficient demands in a multi-product monopoly
• Discrimination through versioning with advertising in social networks
• Informational control and organizational design
• The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
• Information disclosure strategies for the intermediary and competitive sellers
• Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty
• Dynamic learning and strategic communication
• Private disclosure with multiple agents
• Another look at the Radner--Stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information.
• A note on robust procurement contracts
• Interactive Information Design
• On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure
• On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers
• Optimal provision of information about consumption choices in the presence of a cognitive constraint
• Private information in monopoly with random participation
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
• Information control in reputational cheap talk
• Niche market or mass market?
• Price discrimination through communication
• The optimal private information in single unit monopoly
• Optimal decisions for sellers considering valuation bias and strategic consumer reactions
• Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
• Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
• A note on the value of public information in monopoly
• The value of buyer's ignorance in monopoly
• GATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENT
• Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
• Information revelation in competitive markets
• Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
• Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced?
• Vagueness and information-sharing
• Effects of consumers' uncertain valuation-for-quality in a distribution channel

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