Dynamic learning and strategic communication

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0474-XzbMATH Open1388.91064OpenAlexW2082395609MaRDI QIDQ328555FDOQ328555

Authors: Maxim Ivanov 

Publication date: 20 October 2016

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0474-x

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zbMATH Keywords

communicationcheap talkinformation acquisition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Stochastic orders
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• A model of expertise
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Optimal Delegation
• Informational control and organizational design
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
• Information revelation in competitive markets
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Will truth out? -- An advisor's quest to appear competent
• When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
• The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
• Dynamic strategic information transmission
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• Naive audience and communication bias
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• A two-person game of information transmission

Cited In (12)

• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
• The effective communication of system dynamics to improve insight and learning in management education
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
• When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
• Professional advice
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• Perfect robust implementation by private information design
• Strategic gradual learning and information transmission
• Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
• Communication and learning
• Cheap talk with private signal structures

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