Strategic gradual learning and information transmission

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.006zbMath1417.91121OpenAlexW3125953487MaRDI QIDQ1622377

Alexander Frug

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://econ-papers.upf.edu/papers/1544.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkdynamic information transmissiongradual learningstrategic scheduling of experiments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning

Cites Work

• A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space
• Dynamic learning and strategic communication
• Dynamic strategic information transmission
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Communication with endogenous information acquisition
• Informational control and organizational design
• A two-person game of information transmission
• Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control
• Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
• Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information

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