Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
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Cites work
- A two-person game of information transmission
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52563 (Why is no real title available?)
- Informational control and organizational design
- Long Cheap Talk
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Naive audience and communication bias
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
Cited in
(11)- Strategic gradual learning and information transmission
- Dynamic communication with biased senders
- Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
- Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
- Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- The dynamics of loose talk
- Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers
- Perfect robust implementation by private information design
- Dynamic communication with trading commissions
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