Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
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Publication:1675010
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2014-0017zbMATH Open1375.91038OpenAlexW2266097679MaRDI QIDQ1675010FDOQ1675010
Authors: Peng Zhang 
Publication date: 26 October 2017
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2015.15.issue-2/bejte-2014-0017/bejte-2014-0017.xml?format=INT
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Cites Work
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Long Cheap Talk
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- Informational control and organizational design
- Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- Naive audience and communication bias
- A two-person game of information transmission
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (10)
- Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control
- Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers
- Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
- Dynamic communication with biased senders
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
- Perfect robust implementation by private information design
- Strategic gradual learning and information transmission
- The dynamics of loose talk
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
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