Perfect robust implementation by private information design

DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01548-3MaRDI QIDQ6657643zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Maxim Ivanov

Publication date 6 January 2025

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designBayesian persuasionsurplus extractioninformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

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Cites work

• Aggregating the single crossing property
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Cheap talk with private signal structures
• Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems*
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
• Dynamic learning and strategic communication
• Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Full surplus extraction from samples
• Handbook of generalized convexity and generalized monotonicity
• Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Information transmission when the informed party is confused
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
• Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
• Private disclosure with multiple agents
• Redistribution through markets
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• The optimal private information in single unit monopoly

Cited in

(1)

• Private disclosure with multiple agents

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