Perfect robust implementation by private information design
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Publication:6657643
DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01548-3WikidataQ129349715 ScholiaQ129349715MaRDI QIDQ6657643FDOQ6657643
Authors: Maxim Ivanov 
Publication date: 6 January 2025
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems*
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Optimal Auction Design
- On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Handbook of generalized convexity and generalized monotonicity
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Aggregating the single crossing property
- Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
- Communication via a strategic mediator
- Information transmission when the informed party is confused
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- The optimal private information in single unit monopoly
- Private disclosure with multiple agents
- Redistribution through markets
- Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
- Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
- Full surplus extraction from samples
- Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
- Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
Cited In (1)
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