Cheap talk with private signal structures

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.005zbMATH Open1483.91047OpenAlexW4206220740MaRDI QIDQ2078074FDOQ2078074

Authors: Yanyan Li 

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.005

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zbMATH Keywords

strategic communicationBayesian persuasioninformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• A model of expertise
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
• Optimal Delegation
• Handbook of generalized convexity and generalized monotonicity
• Informational control and organizational design
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Aggregating the single crossing property
• Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
• Dynamic learning and strategic communication
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
• Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
• A 2-Person Game with Lack of Information on 1½ Sides
• Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk
• Ambiguous persuasion
• Communication with endogenous information acquisition

Cited In (4)

• Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
• Private disclosure with multiple agents
• Perfect robust implementation by private information design
• Cheap talk with two-sided private information

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