Cheap talk with private signal structures
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2078074
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.005zbMATH Open1483.91047OpenAlexW4206220740MaRDI QIDQ2078074FDOQ2078074
Authors: Yanyan Li
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.005
Recommendations
Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Cites Work
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- A model of expertise
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Strategic Information Transmission
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
- Optimal Delegation
- Handbook of generalized convexity and generalized monotonicity
- Informational control and organizational design
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
- Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
- Aggregating the single crossing property
- Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Communication via a strategic mediator
- A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- A 2-Person Game with Lack of Information on 1½ Sides
- Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk
- Ambiguous persuasion
- Communication with endogenous information acquisition
Cited In (4)
This page was built for publication: Cheap talk with private signal structures
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2078074)