Cheap talk with private signal structures
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Publication:2078074
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.005zbMath1483.91047OpenAlexW4206220740MaRDI QIDQ2078074
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.005
Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
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Cites Work
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