Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment

DOI10.1007/S00199-021-01386-1MaRDI QIDQ2074041zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daehong Min

Publication date 4 February 2022

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01386-1

zbMATH Keywords

communicationcheap talkBayesian persuasionimperfect commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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Cites work

• Bayesian persuasion with cheap talk
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Commitment and observability in games
• Costly miscalibration
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
• Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Private Bayesian persuasion
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic communication with lying costs
• Testing, disclosure and approval
• Unobserved Delegation

Cited in

(15)

• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Influential news and policy-making
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
• Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
• BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
• Cheap talk with private signal structures
• Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning
• On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
• Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion with cheap talk
• The strategic role of nonbinding communication
• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals

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