Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
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Publication:2074041
DOI10.1007/S00199-021-01386-1zbMATH Open1482.91042OpenAlexW3198303905MaRDI QIDQ2074041FDOQ2074041
Authors: Daehong Min 
Publication date: 4 February 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01386-1
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2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Cites Work
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Unobserved Delegation
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
- Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
- Commitment and observability in games
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Persuasion with costly precision
- Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Private Bayesian persuasion
- Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
- Bayesian persuasion with cheap talk
- Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
- Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
- Testing, disclosure and approval
- Costly miscalibration
Cited In (16)
- Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
- BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Influential news and policy-making
- On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
- Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
- Bayesian persuasion with cheap talk
- On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
- Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
- Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
- Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning
- Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
- Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis
- The strategic role of nonbinding communication
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