Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105678zbMath1521.91037OpenAlexW4379879972MaRDI QIDQ6175530

Ludmila Matysková, Alfonso Hernández-Montes

Publication date: 18 August 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105678

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasioncostly information acquisitioninformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items

Long information design, Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition, ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN, Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition

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