Optimal attention management: a tractable framework

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.029zbMath1492.91175arXiv2006.07729OpenAlexW4221085202MaRDI QIDQ2673218

Dong Wei, Elliot Lipnowski, Laurent Mathevet

Publication date: 9 June 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.07729

zbMATH Keywords

information disclosurerational inattentioncostly information processingpaternalistic information design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (1)

Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition

Cites Work

• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Persuasion under costly learning
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options

This page was built for publication: Optimal attention management: a tractable framework