Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.004zbMath1393.91020OpenAlexW2615461813MaRDI QIDQ2013357

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

communication information revelation collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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