Expert advice to a voting body

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.08.005MaRDI QIDQ893397zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Keith E. Schnakenberg

Publication date 19 November 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.005

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talksignalingsocial choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
• Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting
• Pivotal persuasion
• Voting with public information
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

Cites work

• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Communication and bargaining in the spatial model
• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Generic Instability of Majority Rule
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(13)

• How to use expert advice
• Pivotal persuasion
• Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
• Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly
• Expert advising under checks and balances
• Algorithmic aspects of private Bayesian persuasion
• Legislative informational lobbying
• Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
• Preselection and expert advice
• When to seek expert advice? A simple model of borrowers with limited liability
• Voting to persuade
• A nonspeculation theorem with an application to committee design
• Private Bayesian persuasion

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