Expert advice to a voting body
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Publication:893397
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.08.005zbMATH Open1369.91050OpenAlexW3123220514MaRDI QIDQ893397FDOQ893397
Authors: Keith E. Schnakenberg 
Publication date: 19 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.005
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Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Strategic Information Transmission
- General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting
- Generic Instability of Majority Rule
- Communication and bargaining in the spatial model
- Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
Cited In (13)
- A nonspeculation theorem with an application to committee design
- Private Bayesian persuasion
- Voting to persuade
- How to use expert advice
- Pivotal persuasion
- Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
- Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly
- Legislative informational lobbying
- When to seek expert advice? A simple model of borrowers with limited liability
- Preselection and expert advice
- Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
- Expert advising under checks and balances
- Algorithmic aspects of private Bayesian persuasion
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