Expert advice to a voting body

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.005zbMath1369.91050OpenAlexW3123220514MaRDI QIDQ893397

Keith E. Schnakenberg

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.005

zbMATH Keywords

signalingsocial choicecheap talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Social choice (91B14)

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Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion. ⋮ Private Bayesian persuasion ⋮ When to seek expert advice? A simple model of borrowers with limited liability ⋮ Legislative informational lobbying ⋮ Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent ⋮ Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers ⋮ Pivotal persuasion ⋮ Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ A nonspeculation theorem with an application to committee design

Cites Work

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