The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

DOI10.1007/BF01763051zbMATH Open0415.90087WikidataQ56460168 ScholiaQ56460168MaRDI QIDQ754097FDOQ754097

D. Kharzeev

Publication date: 1979

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

simple gamegroup decisionsordinal preferencescooperative n-person gamedictator problemnecessary and sufficient conditions for nonemptiness of corewinning coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Stability in Voting
• Consistent Voting Systems
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto

Cited In (76)

• On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games
• Computational complexity in the design of voting rules
• Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders
• Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
• Structural instability of the core
• The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form
• On the core of voting games
• A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference
• A note on the core of voting games
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
• Smooth social choice
• The structure of unstable power mechanisms
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
• Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions
• Existence of a multicameral core
• Self-consistency of decision rules for group decision making
• A core of voting games with improved foresight
• A stability index for local effectivity functions
• Interaction sheaves on continuous domains
• Cores and capacities of compound simple games
• Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
• Coalitional strategic games
• Note on the core and compensation in collective choice
• On the core and bargaining set of a veto game
• Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change
• \(F\)-decomposable social aggregation rules and acyclic choice
• Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
• Expert advice to a voting body
• Retrospective survey: Kenjiro Nakamura (1947-1979)
• Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
• The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
• Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
• Binary effectivity rules
• ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES
• Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
• Decomposable effectivity functions
• Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
• Product filters, acyclicity and suzumura consistency
• Quota games and stability set of order \(d\)
• The Core of Voting Games: A Partition Approach
• The strategy-proof social choice functions
• Conditions on social-preference cycles
• Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency
• On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval
• Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation
• Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules
• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
• Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
• Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
• Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
• Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
• Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
• Revealed votes
• Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
• Explaining All Possible Paired Comparison Problems
• Gabrielle Demange
• A dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players
• The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games
• The ``probability of a fit choice
• Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
• The legislative calendar
• Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index
• Stability and index of the meet game on a lattice
• A Model of Consensus and Consensus Building Within the Framework of Committees with Permissible Ranges of Decision Makers
• A brief history of social choice and welfare theory
• The stability of decision making in committees: the one-core
• Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems
• Bounds for the Nakamura number

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