On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games
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Publication:1813696
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(90)90060-KzbMath0738.90006MaRDI QIDQ1813696
Publication date: 25 June 1992
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(90)90060-k
Related Items
Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule, SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS, ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES
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