SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS
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Publication:2852562
DOI10.1142/S0219198913400124zbMath1275.91050MaRDI QIDQ2852562
Mathieu Martin, Maurice Salles
Publication date: 9 October 2013
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Social choice (91B14)
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