A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set
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Publication:2388770
DOI10.1007/s003550050178zbMath1069.91507MaRDI QIDQ2388770
Publication date: 20 September 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050178
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