A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
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Publication:5528372
DOI10.2307/1909947zbMath0149.17003OpenAlexW2064109654WikidataQ56225008 ScholiaQ56225008MaRDI QIDQ5528372
Publication date: 1966
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/8a055bef79fbeaa52cc55e80aa0bb2fd37b2bd2e
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