A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
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Publication:5528372
DOI10.2307/1909947zbMATH Open0149.17003OpenAlexW2064109654WikidataQ56225008 ScholiaQ56225008MaRDI QIDQ5528372FDOQ5528372
Authors: Amartya Sen 
Publication date: 1966
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/8a055bef79fbeaa52cc55e80aa0bb2fd37b2bd2e
Cited In (79)
- Towards a classification of maximal peak-pit Condorcet domains
- Social Choice Theory
- Majority voting on restricted domains
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On some suggestions for having non-binary social choice functions
- The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
- A necessary and sufficient single-profile condition for transitivity of the majority rule relation
- Should social choice be based on binary comparisons?
- Geometric models of consistent judgement aggregation
- On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
- The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization
- The NIP graph of a social welfare function
- Introduction to judgment aggregation
- Introduction to judgment aggregation
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- The voters' paradox, spin, and the Borda count
- Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
- Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
- A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling
- Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
- Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces†
- Condorcet domains satisfying Arrow's single-peakedness
- Generalized Sen-Coherence and existence of preferred with probability at least half winners
- Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
- Preference exclusions for social rationality
- Simple majority rule and integer programming
- Condorcet domains, median graphs and the single-crossing property
- Aggregation of preferences: a review
- An approval-voting polytope for linear orders
- A general possibility theorem for group decision rules with Pareto- transitivity
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
- Majority-approval social choice
- Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice
- Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
- The algebra of majority consensus
- Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
- A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
- Arrow's theorem and theory choice
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
- Representations of votes based on pairwise information: monotonicity versus consistency
- Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
- Acyclic sets of linear orders via the Bruhat orders
- Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
- Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
- Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems
- Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
- Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- What majority decisions are possible
- The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- Complexity and the geometry of voting
- A limited possibility result for social choice under majority voting
- ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
- Transitivity of preference on a smooth manifold of alternatives
- A simple proof of Sen's possibility theorem on majority decisions
- Structured preferences: a literature survey
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory
- On transitivity of the social preference relation under simple majority rule
- Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report
- SOME ORDER DUALITIES IN LOGIC, GAMES AND CHOICES
- Some characterizations of resolute majority rules
- Mathematics in the Study of Politics
- An extension and an alternative characterization of May's theorem
- Conditions on preferences that guarantee a simple majority winner†
- Dynamic collective argumentation: constructing the revision and contraction operators
- Symmetric maximal Condorcet domains
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Reduction theorems in the social choice theory
- Sensitivity analyses and measurements for group decisions using weighted scoring rules
- The extended Condorcet condition: A necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of majority decision
- A family of Condorcet domains that are single-peaked on a circle
- Revealed preference domains from random choice
- Strategic voting and strategic candidacy
- Majority judgment over a convex candidate space
- Collective argumentation with topological restrictions
- A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains
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