Aggregation of preferences: a review

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(82)90004-2MaRDI QIDQ1158068zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philippe Vincke

Publication date 1982

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(82)90004-2

zbMATH Keywords

surveybibliographyreviewvoting procedureschoice functionsBibliographyaggregation of preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-02)

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Cited in

(4)

• Fusion: General concepts and characteristics
• Bipolar preference modeling and aggregation in decision support
• Special issue: Data and knowledge fusion. Part 1 of 2
• Aggregation of partial ordinal ranking: An interval goal programming approach

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