Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives

DOI10.2307/1911974MaRDI QIDQ4041306zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 1974

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1911974

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Cited in

(13)

• Simple majority voting isn't special
• Condorcet's paradox
• The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
• A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
• The probability of Condorcet cycles and super majority rules
• Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
• Proportions of profiles with a majority candidate
• Aggregation of preferences: a review
• Condorcet proportions and Kelly's conjectures
• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
• Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
• The probability of intransitivity of pairwise comparisons in individual preference
• Intrinsic Limitations of the Majority Rule, an Algorithmic Approach

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