Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90061-0MaRDI QIDQ1162267zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William V. Gehrlein

Publication date 1982

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90061-0

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet efficiencyCondorcet winnerconstant scoring rulesexact closed form relationsthree element rankingstwo stage constant rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• Proportions of profiles with a majority candidate
• The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
• Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives

Cited in

(21)

• The unexpected behavior of plurality rule
• The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
• The expected likelihood of transitivity: A survey
• The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist.
• Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
• Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
• Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation
• On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• The expected likelihood of transitivity for probabilistic choosers with single-peaked preferences
• Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
• Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences
• Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?
• The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
• The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
• From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture
• IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
• The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
• Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
• Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains

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