Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
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Publication:1707108
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1069-1zbMath1392.91063OpenAlexW2631870218MaRDI QIDQ1707108
Issofa Moyouwou, Hatem Smaoui, Dominique Lepelley
Publication date: 28 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1069-1
Related Items (6)
Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention ⋮ The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner ⋮ Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure ⋮ Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
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- A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Counting Integral Points in Polyhedra When the Dimension is Fixed
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Condorcet’s Paradox
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