The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(95)00804-7zbMath0921.90042WikidataQ55895654 ScholiaQ55895654MaRDI QIDQ1278562

Sven Berg, Frédéric Chantreuil, Dominique Lepelley

Publication date: 17 September 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(95)00804-7

zbMATH Keywords

voting theory; social choice; monotonicity paradoxes; run-off elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

Related Items

Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions, IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report, Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation, Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules, Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections, Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
• The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
• On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• On probability models in voting theory