Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting
- Duplication in OWA-generated positional aggregation rules
- Building bridges over the great divide
- Measuring violations of positive involvement in voting
- Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule
- Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections
- Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
- Representations of votes based on pairwise information: monotonicity versus consistency
- Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
- Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
- Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
- Scoring indices, top-truncated preferences, and splitting invariance
- On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
- Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity
- Representation in majority tournaments
- Categorization generated by extended prototypes -- an axiomatic approach
- Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
- Welfare maximization entices participation
- Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias
- Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
- Two‐stage majoritarian choice
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
- Monotonicity and Other Paradoxes in Some Proportional Representation Schemes
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
- Weighted approval voting
- Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
- On the information about individual utilities used in social choice
- Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
- Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting
- An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting
- Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency
- How to choose a fair delegation?
- Utilitarianism without individual utilities
- Social threshold aggregations
- Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
- A new characterization of simple majority
- A family of distances for preference-approvals
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
- A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules
- An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium
- Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties
- A geometric model of sensitivity of multistage elections to change
- The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet
- On the probability of observing Borda's paradox
- Rank-based choice correspondences
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
- Some Remarks on Dodgson's Voting Rule
- Variable-population voting rules
- Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
- New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness
- Two characterizations of the dense rank
- Condorcet-loser dominance between the plurality rule and other scoring rules
- Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
- The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
- The maximin support method: an extension of the d'Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections
- Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
- THE PROPORTIONAL LOTTERY PROTOCOL IS STRONGLY β-PARTICIPATORY AND VNM-STRATEGY-PROOF
- Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
- A non-dictatorial compromise
- Majority rule on j-rich ballot spaces
- Majority rule in the absence of a majority
- Consistency of decision processes
- Social Choice Theory
- Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
- Another perspective on Borda's paradox
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem
- Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
- Voting rules as statistical estimators
- Ranking journals in sociology, education, and public administration by social choice theory methods
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
- Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
- Neutrality and independence of alternatives in group decisions
- Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
- On the construction of non-empty choice sets
- A characterization of the plurality rule
- King-chicken choice correspondences
- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
- Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
- A characterization of the generalized optimal choice set through the optimization of generalized weak utilities
- Representations of votes facilitating monotonicity-based ranking rules: from votrix to votex
- Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
- The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- Revealed votes
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- Minimal stable sets in tournaments
- A topological characterization of the existence of non-empty choice sets
- Social choice rules driven by propositional logic
- Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
- Consistent social ranking solutions
- Consensus rules for committee elections
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