Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- THE PROPORTIONAL LOTTERY PROTOCOL IS STRONGLY β-PARTICIPATORY AND VNM-STRATEGY-PROOF
- Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
- A non-dictatorial compromise
- Majority rule on j-rich ballot spaces
- Majority rule in the absence of a majority
- Consistency of decision processes
- Social Choice Theory
- Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
- Another perspective on Borda's paradox
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem
- Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
- Voting rules as statistical estimators
- Ranking journals in sociology, education, and public administration by social choice theory methods
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
- Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
- Neutrality and independence of alternatives in group decisions
- Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
- On the construction of non-empty choice sets
- A characterization of the plurality rule
- King-chicken choice correspondences
- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
- Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
- A characterization of the generalized optimal choice set through the optimization of generalized weak utilities
- Representations of votes facilitating monotonicity-based ranking rules: from votrix to votex
- Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
- The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- Revealed votes
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- Minimal stable sets in tournaments
- A topological characterization of the existence of non-empty choice sets
- Social choice rules driven by propositional logic
- Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
- Consistent social ranking solutions
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- The Borda dictionary
- Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- Clustering alternatives in preference-approvals via novel pseudometrics
- Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems
- What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
- An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule
- The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
- A New Binary Programming Formulation and Social Choice Property for Kemeny Rank Aggregation
- Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization
- A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
- Robustness against inefficient manipulation
- Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
- A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value
- SSB utility theory: An economic perspective
- Social choice and computational complexity
- Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
- Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
- The median rule in judgement aggregation
- Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension
- Balancedness of social choice correspondences
- The Borda rule and the pairwise-majority-loser revisited
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- Formal utilitarianism and range voting
- Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal
- The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
- Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
- A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- Money-metric utilitarianism
- Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
- On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives
- The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
- Size approval voting
- The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited
- Aggregation of preferences: a review
- A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
- Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations
- Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
- Utility in case-based decision theory
- Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
- Choosing from a tournament
- A continuous rating method for preferential voting: the complete case
- Group support and top-heavy rules
- Spatial implementation
- The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
- Dominant strategies and restricted ballots with variable electorate
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population
- How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
- Criteria for judging the rationality of decisions in the presence of vague alternatives
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
- Voting: a machine learning approach
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
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