Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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Publication:4773465
DOI10.2307/1914033zbMATH Open0286.90008OpenAlexW2047294939WikidataQ56169495 ScholiaQ56169495MaRDI QIDQ4773465FDOQ4773465
Authors: John Howard Smith
Publication date: 1973
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914033
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
- Majority rule in the absence of a majority
- Consistency of decision processes
- Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
- Another perspective on Borda's paradox
- On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem
- Voting rules as statistical estimators
- Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
- Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
- Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
- Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
- On the construction of non-empty choice sets
- Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
- A characterization of the plurality rule
- A characterization of the generalized optimal choice set through the optimization of generalized weak utilities
- Representations of votes facilitating monotonicity-based ranking rules: from votrix to votex
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- Social choice rules driven by propositional logic
- Minimal stable sets in tournaments
- A topological characterization of the existence of non-empty choice sets
- Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- The Borda dictionary
- Social choice and computational complexity
- SSB utility theory: An economic perspective
- Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
- The median rule in judgement aggregation
- The Borda rule and the pairwise-majority-loser revisited
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
- Formal utilitarianism and range voting
- The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives
- The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
- The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
- A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
- Utility in case-based decision theory
- Choosing from a tournament
- How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
- The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
- Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
- Representation in majority tournaments
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
- Categorization generated by extended prototypes -- an axiomatic approach
- Monotonicity and Other Paradoxes in Some Proportional Representation Schemes
- Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
- Weighted approval voting
- Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency
- Social threshold aggregations
- A new characterization of simple majority
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
- On the probability of observing Borda's paradox
- Rank-based choice correspondences
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
- Variable-population voting rules
- Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
- The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
- Social Choice Theory
- Majority rule on \(j\)-rich ballot spaces
- A non-dictatorial compromise
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- Ranking journals in sociology, education, and public administration by social choice theory methods
- Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
- Neutrality and independence of alternatives in group decisions
- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- King-chicken choice correspondences
- The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences
- Consistent social ranking solutions
- Revealed votes
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
- Clustering alternatives in preference-approvals via novel pseudometrics
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
- Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization
- A New Binary Programming Formulation and Social Choice Property for Kemeny Rank Aggregation
- Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems
- An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule
- The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
- A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value
- Robustness against inefficient manipulation
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