Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Size approval voting
- Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
- Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
- Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
- On the information about individual utilities used in social choice
- Choosing from a tournament
- Social choice and computational complexity
- A non-dictatorial compromise
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
- Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
- Aggregation of preferences: a review
- Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
- Dominant strategies and restricted ballots with variable electorate
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Neutrality and independence of alternatives in group decisions
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- Criteria for judging the rationality of decisions in the presence of vague alternatives
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
- Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
- A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
- Revealed votes
- Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
- Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population
- Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties
- Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity
- A geometric model of sensitivity of multistage elections to change
- The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet
- Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
- Welfare maximization entices participation
- The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
- Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
- The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
- A continuous rating method for preferential voting: the complete case
- Group support and top-heavy rules
- The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
- Representation in majority tournaments
- Majority rule on j-rich ballot spaces
- Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
- The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences
- Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
- Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- How to choose a fair delegation?
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- King-chicken choice correspondences
- The median rule in judgement aggregation
- A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
- Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections
- The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
- Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
- Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
- On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
- How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
- Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
- Social choice rules driven by propositional logic
- Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
- Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations
- Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
- The Borda rule and the pairwise-majority-loser revisited
- Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
- Majority rule in the absence of a majority
- Utilitarianism without individual utilities
- Balancedness of social choice correspondences
- Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
- Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules
- Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule
- Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias
- An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule
- Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension
- Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
- What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
- Formal utilitarianism and range voting
- Money-metric utilitarianism
- Voting rules as statistical estimators
- Robustness against inefficient manipulation
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
- Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
- Voting: a machine learning approach
- Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
- A characterization of the generalized optimal choice set through the optimization of generalized weak utilities
- Representations of votes facilitating monotonicity-based ranking rules: from votrix to votex
- On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives
- Duplication in OWA-generated positional aggregation rules
- The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited
- Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
- The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
- Some Remarks on Dodgson's Voting Rule
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- THE PROPORTIONAL LOTTERY PROTOCOL IS STRONGLY β-PARTICIPATORY AND VNM-STRATEGY-PROOF
- Monotonicity and Other Paradoxes in Some Proportional Representation Schemes
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