Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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Publication:4773465
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
- Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
- Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
- A characterization of the generalized optimal choice set through the optimization of generalized weak utilities
- Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
- Representations of votes facilitating monotonicity-based ranking rules: from votrix to votex
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
- A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- A topological characterization of the existence of non-empty choice sets
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
- On the probability of observing Borda's paradox
- Consistency of decision processes
- Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
- Choosing from a tournament
- Social threshold aggregations
- Formal utilitarianism and range voting
- Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
- The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
- Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
- Utility in case-based decision theory
- Monotonicity and Other Paradoxes in Some Proportional Representation Schemes
- Another perspective on Borda's paradox
- Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
- Rank-based choice correspondences
- A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules
- Representation in majority tournaments
- A new characterization of simple majority
- On the construction of non-empty choice sets
- Variable-population voting rules
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
- On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives
- The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
- Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- A characterization of the plurality rule
- Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- Categorization generated by extended prototypes -- an axiomatic approach
- The median rule in judgement aggregation
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
- The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited
- Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
- Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency
- Majority rule in the absence of a majority
- Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
- The Borda dictionary
- Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- Social choice and computational complexity
- On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem
- A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
- SSB utility theory: An economic perspective
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
- Voting rules as statistical estimators
- Weighted approval voting
- The Borda rule and the pairwise-majority-loser revisited
- Minimal stable sets in tournaments
- Social choice rules driven by propositional logic
- Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
- Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
- A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value
- Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
- Welfare maximization entices participation
- Voting: a machine learning approach
- Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
- On the information about individual utilities used in social choice
- Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
- Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
- A continuous rating method for preferential voting: the complete case
- Group support and top-heavy rules
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
- A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
- Duplication in OWA-generated positional aggregation rules
- A family of distances for preference-approvals
- Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
- Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
- Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
- Criteria for judging the rationality of decisions in the presence of vague alternatives
- Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias
- Representations of votes based on pairwise information: monotonicity versus consistency
- Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting
- An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting
- Condorcet-loser dominance between the plurality rule and other scoring rules
- What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
- Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
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