Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
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Abstract: Committee scoring rules form a rich class of aggregators of voters' preferences for the purpose of selecting subsets of objects with desired properties, e.g., a shortlist of candidates for an interview, a representative collective body such as a parliament, or a set of locations for a set of public facilities. In the spirit of celebrated Young's characterization result that axiomatizes single-winner scoring rules, we provide an axiomatic characterization of multiwinner committee scoring rules. We show that committee scoring rules---despite forming a remarkably general class of rules---are characterized by the set of four standard axioms, anonymity, neutrality, consistency and continuity, and by one axiom specific to multiwinner rules which we call committee dominance. In the course of our proof, we develop several new notions and techniques. In particular, we introduce and axiomatically characterize multiwinner decision scoring rules, a class of rules that broadly generalizes the well-known majority relation.
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Cited in
(30)- Characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation
- Revealed votes
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
- An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule
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- A general scoring rule
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