Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
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Publication:2353589
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Cites work
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Cited in
(25)- Characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation
- A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
- Robust winner determination in positional scoring rules with uncertain weights
- Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
- On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence
- The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited
- A general scoring rule
- Social choice violations in rank sum scoring: a formalization of conditions and corrective probability computations
- New Approximations for Coalitional Manipulation in Scoring Rules
- Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules
- Scoring indices, top-truncated preferences, and splitting invariance
- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
- A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting
- A general model for dealing with ranking voting systems
- Ranking voting systems and surrogate weights: explicit formulas for centroid weights
- Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization
- The informational basis of scoring rules
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