Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
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Publication:2353589
DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9429-0zbMath1377.91085OpenAlexW1973450406WikidataQ58341321 ScholiaQ58341321MaRDI QIDQ2353589
Bonifacio Llamazares, Teresa Peña
Publication date: 15 July 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/21499
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